writings until the Renaissance. The degree to which medieval alchemists and their supporters were forced to develop their positive views about the power of technology in order to salvage their art from the increasingly hostile audience of the late Middle Ages is truly remarkable. This essay will attempt to trace the alchemical debate from its inception in the second half of the twelfth century up to a definite crisis reached in the first quarter of the fourteenth century.7 attributed to Aristotle exists today in over thirty-five manuscripts, many of them medieval.9 Similarly, a long section of Avicenna's Book of the Remedy that attacked alchemy was habitually attributed to Aristotle by medieval writers. Some, confronted by Aristotle's seeming to support alchemy in one text while attacking it in another, went so far as to devise a developmental hypothesis in which the young Stagyrite was harshly critical but changed his views in the wisdom of old age. 10 Nor is it sufficient to argue that alchemy was denied university status because of its characterization as a technology (mechanical art). In fact, alchemy occupied a medial position between the arts and the sciences, a position also occupied by medicine. Like medicine, alchemy consisted of a body of theory about certain aspects of the natural world; this theory was then used to support a plethora of manual practices. Thomas Aquinas, to cite one example, variously calls alchemy an "operative science," a "mechanical art," and an "operative art." In the first case, he ranks "medicine, alchemy, and moral [philosophy]" together, since they have a practical use and pertain more to specific subjects than do such fields as metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. In the second and third cases, Thomas groups alchemy with agriculture and medicine as technological pursuits subordinate to physics.1" But the medieval university curriculum frequently included such subjects as medicine and moral philosophy, despite Thomas's classification of them as, respectively, "mechanical" or "operative." We cannot therefore view the learned disdain for the practical and technological as sufficient cause for alchemy's exclusion from the medieval university, though it may have been a contributing factor.
Far more convincing explanations for alchemy's lack of institutional success than such general ones as the genuine Aristotle's silence or the learned disdain for technology can be found by examining specific medieval documents. It then becomes clear that between the time of alchemy's inception in the mid-twelfth century and the end of the thirteenth century a general backlash against this discipline gradually developed, with mainstream scientific and religious authorities coming to agree in its denunciation. In such an atmosphere it would have been academically unprofitable, to say the least, for a university master to teach alchemy publicly. The result is that alchemical writers went "underground." Anyone who seriously consults the alchemical bibliography of the Latin Middle Ages cannot fail to be impressed by the large number of pseudepigrapha.12 The authority of a genuine Aristotelian production, since it appeared to be the conclusion of the Meteorologica's fourth book. 14 It became thereby the locus classicus for all subsequent attacks on alchemy, and virtually any alchemical writer-whether philosophically sophisticated or not-felt obliged to respond to the arguments of "Aristotle" (i.e., Avicenna). In the process, the De congelatione of Avicenna became a focal point for the discussion of human artisanal power in general. The De congelatione contains a description of geological processes, including the formation of the known metals-gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, and iron. Following the doctrines of Arabic alchemy, Avicenna asserts that these six are composed of mercury (mercury is considered not a metal but a component of metals) and sulfur in varying quantities and degrees of purity. It therefore comes as something of a shock when he proceeds to denounce the doctrine of metallic transmutation, upon which alchemical practice is based. Avicenna's main points may be summarized under two heads:
1. Artificial and natural products are intrinsically different, for art is inherently inferior to nature and cannot hope to equal it. Therefore artificers cannot change an inferior metal to a better one, although they can produce passable imitations of the precious metals by inducing superficial characteristics. 2. The true species-determining characteristics of metals cannot be known, since they subsist beneath the level of sense. Since these specific differences are unknown, it will be impossible to bring about the to authenticity of any Albertine alchemical work, is a forgery: William Newman, "The Genesis of the Avicenna's argument may seem prima facie self-evident to the modern reader, but the terms "species" and "specific difference" are somewhat nuanced. Avicenna's terminology has a logical basis. When he used the term nauc, rendered in Latin by Alfred of Sareshel as species, he meant above all to refer to the group of characteristics defining a particular kind of thing. To Avicenna there are six such species among metals: gold, silver, copper, iron, tin, and lead. All six belong to the more general genus of metals, which he informally defines as "malleable," "fusible," "mineral" (that is to say "mined") bodies.15 Hence each type of metal shares the set of properties that define the genus: anything that is a malleable, fusible body found in mines will be a metal. But the metals are not all identical: gold, silver, copper, iron, tin, and lead, while metals, also have their own specific differences that make each of them belong to a particular species. The thrust of Avicenna's conclusion is that the specific differences that make metals fall into different species are not such easily perceived properties as melting point, malleability, specific gravity, and color. Instead, the specific differences are really underlying and imperceptible: we cannot know them, and therefore we cannot change them.
It may be tempting for the modern reader to view Avicenna's rejection of alchemy as a forward-looking event that foreshadowed the weaning of chemistry from the "irrational" or "pseudoscientific" doctrines of alchemy. A closer look will reveal, however, that it was Avicenna, and not the alchemists, who held reactionary views. Avicenna begins his attack with the "self-evident" assertion that natural products are intrinsically superior to their artificial counterparts and that the latter cannot possibly match up to the naturally occurring exemplars of which they are copies. As two modern commentators on the De congelatione have remarked, Avicenna would have been on the side of "the general public [today], who usually imagine that synthetic indigo, for example, is not veritable indigo, but only a very good imitation."'16 Avicenna, though basing himself on an ancient prejudice, in fact takes a considerably stronger position about the schism between natural and artificial products than did Aristotle. In the Physics (2.8, 199a) the latter allows art either to mimic nature or to carry some of her works to a greater state of perfection than they would otherwise have: "One sort of art perfects that which nature cannot complete, while another sort imitates nature.''17 One almost gets the impression that a personal experience with alchemical counterfeiters led Avicenna to his disdain for human art as expressed in the De congelatione. Whatever the sources for his view, the universal proposition that art is inferior to nature, coupled to the belief that natural species are intransmutable, constituted an attack not on alchemy alone but on the totality of technology and applied science. Avicenna's point was not merely that human technology cannot outdo nature but that man cannot even hope to imitate nature in a truly successful fashion. Avicenna thus first clothes the ancient philosophical disdain for technology in the form of an "authoritative" enunciation, then spells out the specific reasons for alchemy's failure in terms of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Later we shall find such varied claims as the impotence of demons to work miracles and the inability of horticulturalists to produce new breeds of plants supported by reference to Avicenna's dictum that alchemists cannot transmute species. The effects of the De congelatione were by no means restricted to alchemy but served to crystallize an antitechnological bias in many areas.
In response to Avicenna's dictum that species are intransmutable-which came to be referred to in abbreviated form by the incipit Sciant artifices-the alchemists developed counterarguments adopting a radical view of technology in which man assumed extraordinary power over nature. Centuries before Francis Bacon's philosophy of nature with its Draconian decree to "put nature to the rack," we find protagonists ot alchemy asserting that man's ability to transform the natural world is virtually unbounded. Their justification of human art was not based on vague optimism, however; it was supported by practical observation, analogical reasoning, and a Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism.
One of the earliest sets of counterarguments to the De congelatione can be found in a pseudonymous Book of Hermes written in the first half of the thirteenth century or before. This work contains a series of elliptical attacks on alchemy, each with its matching rebuttal. The first argument, that metals are natural products and hence may not be replicated by artificial means, implicitly contains Avicenna's axiom that natural products are always better than artificial ones. The author of Hermes rebuts this by saying that human technology frequently succeeds better than nature herself, since artificial verdigris, vitriol, zinc oxide, and sal ammoniac are all better than the naturally occurring forms, "which [anyone] who knows about minerals does not contradict.''18 Similarly, the horticulturist improves on nature by making successful graftings. We have here a sort of manifesto proclaiming the power of technology in general and chemical technology in particular. Interestingly, "Hermes" does not deny that art learns by mimicking nature: in order to eviscerate Avicenna's proposition that art is weaker than nature, it is sufficient for him to point to the empirical fact that certain products have greater efficacy when prepared artificially.
When the author of Hermes comes to Avicenna's assertion that species cannot be transmuted, he adopts the approach of logic: he replies that the metals belong to a single definition, any metal being "a composite, fusible, incombustible, malleable body."19 Logically, there is no compelling reason why this should be called a genus rather than a species, since such differentiation is merely a matter of degree (a genus is merely comprehended by a more general definition than a species). In providing a single definition for all the metals, the author of Hermes can therefore argue that they all belong to a single "species," and that the "species" of which Avicenna speaks are by implication only "more specific species" (species specialiores). Thus The Book of Hermes does not need the transmutation of species. This purely logical approach to undermining the Sciant artifices soon gave way in the West to a more hylomorphic tendency. As we shall see, Albertus Magnus-among others-took Avicenna's species to mean a form that "inheres" physically in the substance of a metal in order to determine its particular set of characteristics. Although permissible within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy (where eidos means either "species" or "form"), Albert's interpretation would have the effect of turning Avicenna's discussion of genera and species into an argument about matter and form. Vincent's rather complacent and confused account of alchemy is followed chronologically by the De mineralibus of Albertus Magnus. Here we find a considerably more coherent assessment. Between 1250 and 1254 Albert took on the task of writing a comprehensive study of mineralogy as part of his endeavor to explain the totality of natural science.23 Since Albert could find no Aristotelian book on minerals to comment on, he had to turn to the texts of the alchemists.
In the course of his investigation, Albert therefore felt the need to respond to the arguments of the De congelatione, which he knew to be a work of Avicenna' s. Albert begins his analysis of transmutation with an attack on previous authors who have proposed that all metals share one form, that of gold, in varying states of completion. Arguing from sense, he says that the metals appear to be "stable" (permanens); under normal circumstances they do not become other metals. Therefore they must each have their own substantial form by which they are "perfected." Similarly, each metal has its own peculiar set of properties, so their accidents are not common. As a result, "the substances and specific form [species] [of different metals] must be different. "24 Given that Albert believes the metals to differ in their species, we might expect him to uphold the viewpoint of the De congelatione. This is not the case, however. In a special chapter he directly attacks the pronouncement Sciant artifices, where Avicenna had argued that alchemists could not transmute species. In this chapter it becomes clear that Albert has understood the Latin species to mean "specific form. "25 This substitution of "specific form" for "species" allows Albert to circumvent the Sciant artifices, since he can now draw on a well-defined Scholastic theory concerning the physical corruption of a preexistent form followed by the induction of a subsequent form. Thus Albert believes that species At any rate, armed with his hylomorphic interpretation of "species," Albert says that honest alchemists act toward metals just as physicians do toward their patients.27 The alchemist first cleans and purifies the old metal, just as a doctor employs emetics and diaphoretics to purge his patient. Then he strengthens the "elemental and celestial powers" in the metal's substance, apparently by adding druglike components and observing astrological "judgments." As a result, the purged metal receives a new and better specific form from the celestial virtues of the stars. Hence the alchemist has not transmuted any species: he has only removed one specific form and prepared the way for another to be received.
Albert's benign view of alchemy does not bear witness to a heated debate on this subject. He is not responding to any moderni but only to Avicenna and other Arabic authors. The equanimity of his tone, furthermore, seems to reflect a period in which alchemical transmutation was not yet a general subject of irascible dispute. When we turn to Roger Bacon, the atmosphere changes radically.
Roger wrote his Opus tertium around the year 1266, as a part of the trilogy also comprising his Opus maius and Opus minus. The three books were intended as an advertisement for reform, and as such they were sent by special courier to Roger's friend Clement IV.28 In the Opus tertium Roger proposes that alchemy should form the primary means of reforming Scholastic science. He asserts that alchemy teaches things of which Aristotle was completely ignorant, such as the precise generation of minerals, pigments, precious stones, and humors from the elements. Furthermore, since alchemy is the science of the elements per se, while natural philosophy and medicine concern things made out of the four elements, such as the four humors, alchemy is the most basic of the sciences. Hence Roger's approbation of alchemy far exceeds that of Vincent or Albert: whereas they see alchemy as primarily a practical art whose masters have provided empirical examples for real philosophers to explain, he wants to make it the wellspring of all medical and natural knowledge. Although modern historians have stressed Roger's mathematics (to the ultimate misfortune of the poor friar), Arts such as agriculture and medicine that act on the primary qualities can actually transmute substance, whereas sculpture, painting, carpentry, and other arts that work only on secondary qualities can only induce accidents into their subject. The genuine physician, horticulturist, or alchemist, therefore, produces real changes in essence and substance, because he manipulates the first qualities of matter. False artisans, on the other hand, produce only the appearance of change; they attack the symptom rather than the cause. When Paul comes to the Sciant artifices, he uses this bifurcation of the arts to remove its force, saying, "We do not consider the opinion of Aristotle which he writes at the end of the Meteorologica-'The alchemists should know that species cannot be transmuted'-to be true unless it be understood in the foresaid way, [that is, as occurring] through purely artificial agents. "34 In other words, the Sciant artifices holds only if the artisan employs secondary, "artificial" qualities, since these do not affect the substance of a given subject. Otherwise, if he uses primary qualities, it is indeed possible to induce substantial change and thus to alter species.
Paul of Taranto's argument, although directed mainly toward alchemy, is undeniably a justification of technology in general, since it upholds the power of those arts capable of manipulating primary qualities to induce real change in natural products. In other words, Paul consistently affirms the power of man really to alter and improve natural products. At the same time, his reasoning implicitly contains more than an apology for technical skill per se. By dividing the "arts" into two categories he implicitly distinguishes between pure technol- ogy (e.g., sculpting, painting, and carpentry) and applied science (e.g., medicine, agriculture, and alchemy).
The difference between these two categories hinges on the second argument of the Sciant artifices, where Avicenna, remarking that the differences between metals are not known, asks: "When the [specific] difference is not known, how will it be possible to know whether it is taken away or not or even how it could be taken away? Removal of the accidents within, however, such as taste, color, and weight, or at least their lessening, is not impossible, for reason is not opposed to this."35 Avicenna's argument relies on the impossibility of the artificer's manipulating that which he cannot recognize, namely, the hidden essential differences that make one metal different from another. The theoretical part of Paul of Taranto's Theorica et practica, therefore, is precisely an attempt to become acquainted with these essential principles of the different metals. These are perceived by means of tests performed in the laboratory or foundry. We know, for example, that metals contain sulfur for the following reason: when metallic ores are "calcined"-oxidized by intense heating-they give off a sulfurous, stinking smoke.36 Some metals, however, contain more sulfur than others. Lead, for example, contains more sulfur than tin and of a more entrenched sort. Paul determines this from the fact that two calcinations of lead leave a yellow, sulfurous calx, while two such firings of tin leave a white calx, although the metal's smoke is still yellow.37
The presence of mercury in the metals is proved by similar means. Mercury readily forms an amalgam with gold, silver, copper, tin, or lead, simply by remaining in intimate contact with any of the said metals. The medieval writers even claimed to be able to amalgamate mercury with iron, though this claim was probably the result of observational error on their part. As Paul says, this striking affinity between quicksilver and the then-known metals "is due to a similarity of substance. "38 But he later describes a procedure by which mercury subjected to 35Avicenna, De congelatione, ed. Newman (cit. n. 14), pp. 61-62: "Differentie metallorum enim non sunt cognite et cum differencia non sit cognita, quomodo poterit sciri utrum tollatur nec ne, vel quomodo tolli possit? Sed expoliacio intus accidentium ut saporis, coloris, ponderis, vel saltem diminucio non impossibilis, quia contra hoc ratio non est. the vapor of molten silver or lead is congealed per se "without the admixture of any other."39 From the modern point of view, the product of this experiment would again be an amalgam. To the alchemist, however, it appeared that the hot, arid vapor of lead served to "dry out" the excess humidity of the mercury, thus allowing it to become a full-blown metal. Hence Paul says that this procedure, by which mercury is "independently" converted from a "spirit" to a metal, shows better than any other demonstration that the "subtlety [of the substance] of the metals" comes from mercury.
Paul supports these experimental demonstrations of the metals' components by an attempt to explain the nature of the metallic principles, sulfur and mercury, in terms of the four primary qualities, hot, cold, wet, and dry. Without going into details, I will point out the thrust of his argument. By arriving at the composition of the two metallic principles in terms of the four qualities, then showing how the two principles can be manipulated to form the six known metals, Paul manages to satisfy Avicenna's objection that the alchemist cannot manipulate that which he does not recognize. Using experimental demonstrations such as those described above and the philosophical framework provided by Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione and Meteorologica, Paul responds that properly educated alchemists really can recognize and manipulate the primary qualities directly. This ability to recognize qualities is precisely what distinguishes alchemists and physicians on the one hand from carpenters and painters on the other. The latter do not attempt to understand the nature of their material at its most fundamental level. They are technically skilled, but their work operates only on the level of appearance, not fundamental change. In other words they are scientifically uninformed artisans-pure technicians-whom Paul is careful to distinguish from those who derive their skill from a direct knowledge of the four Aristotelian qualities. I can think of no better term for the latter than applied scientist, a category already employed in this sense by Lynn Thorndike.40 In effect, therefore, Paul has made a distinction between the applied scientist, who understands and employs the true causes of things, and the simple artisan, who works to produce an effect without true knowledge of its causes. As Avicenna said in the De congelatione, such an artisan cannot change species, for if the specific difference-the cause of the species-is not known, "how will it be possible to know whether it is taken away or not, or how it could be taken away?"41 The applied scientist, according to Paul, does understand the causes of species and can therefore change them.
Of the three Scholastics examined earlier, only Roger Bacon matches the pre- Thus it is impossible for the alchemist to join the form of a precious metal to the substance of a base one in the way that the form of fire is joined to wood, because this must be done deep within the earth, where the mineral power or virtus is subjected to a special strengthening. For the same reason, Thomas adds, "the other things that they [alchemists] make" must also be deficient when compared with their naturally occurring counterparts. Thomas therefore rejects not only the alchemical creation of metals but the artificial synthesis of any chemical product. Such "alchemical" substances as ammonium chloride produced by the destructive decomposition of hair, or copper acetate made with vinegar left in a copper flask, are implicitly rejected as "fake" because they were not generated in the bowels of the earth, "where the mineral power flourishes." A form of this Giles's quaestio actually contains two questions: first, "whether man can make true gold by art," and second, "given that he can make gold, whether it be permissible to sell such gold." Relying on the Sciant artifices, Giles paraphrases Avicenna's argument that nature is better than art, saying that art is only a principle of artificial things, whereas gold is not artificial but natural.51
Then Giles introduces the argument of the virtus loci. Admitting that some creatures, such as the bees generated spontaneously from dead cattle, do not need a specific place of generation but only a "material principle" (putrefying matter), he argues that other things, such as wine made from grapes, need both this material principle and a specific place of generation, for wine is produced only "in the depth of the grape" (in ventre vitis). Similarly, Giles says, "it is also believable" that metals must be generated deep within the earth.
The second question, "given that man can make gold, whether it is permissible to sell such gold," Giles refuses to entertain seriously, since he is unequivocally convinced that artificial gold cannot be made. At this point he reveals the true nature of his argument, saying that even if gold that would withstand the assayer's test of cupellation could be made, it would still not be legal tender, since it would not have all the medical properties of natural gold.52 It follows that such a product would not be real gold, despite the assayer's judgment. No doubt Giles would have said the same even if such artificial gold had the same specific weight as natural gold, for to him, mineral gold and artificial gold can never be the same, regardless of their properties. Like Avicenna, Giles has adopted the immutable principle that artificial products can never be the same as their natural models.
The last three decades of the thirteenth century witnessed an increasingly hostile attitude by religious authorities toward alchemy that culminated eventually in the denunciation Contra alchymistas, written by the well-known inquisitor Nicholas Eymeric in 1396. Giles's attack was preceded, for example, by a number of interdictions issued by the religious orders; the Dominicans alone propounded condemnations of alchemy in 1272, 1287, 1289, and 1323. The movement to prohibit alchemy was given papal authority in 1317, when John XXII issued his well-known bull "Spondent quas non exhibent,"-after he had held a public disputation between alchemists and their detractors, according to Eymeric. This papal document is directed specifically against alchemists who employ their artificial gold for counterfeiting; it was motivated by purely fiscal reasons, for the debasement of coin by counterfeiters, alchemical or otherwise, presented a serious problem to the medieval commonwealth. It thus contains little theoretical justification. Nonetheless, the bull does say that the alchemists feign "that which is not in the nature of things," indicating that John did not believe alchemical transmutation to be physically possible. ble; he points out instead that the species of the metal is not transmuted, but only the metal itself. The origin of this strange-sounding claim was probably a late thirteenth-century alchemical work ascribed spuriously to Roger Bacon, the Breve breviarium. It is quite likely that the author of the Breve breviarium originated this defense himself, as it seems to be developed at greater length here than in any other medieval alchemical text. By claiming that the species of the metals are not transmuted, but only the metals themselves, the Breve breviarium means that the group of characteristics that make silver silver (its argenteity) and gold gold (its aureity) do not change if an individual piece of silver is transmuted into an individual piece of gold.57 Gold will still be defined, for example, as a "yellow, soft, malleable, fusible, heavy, body," and silver as a "white, soft, malleable, fusible body, of moderate weight." Nonetheless, an individual piece of silver can be physically transmuted so that its matter will conform to the definition of gold. Hence, the physical characteristics of the individual piece of silver will have been changed to the degree that they now belong to the species of gold.
Oldrado's consilium, although taking the same approach as the Breve breviarium, differs from that text in its motivation. While the Breve breviarium's argument seems to be directed solely against the De congelatione, Oldrado is responding to the Canon Episcopi, which explicitly said that only God could transmute species. Oldrado's response is therefore intended to bear the onus of doctrinal correctness, whereas the Breve breviarium's-at least overtly-is not. We have already seen Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome treat alchemy in a theological context, where Thomas even mentioned alchemists in the same breath as demons. Like Thomas and Giles, Oldrado sees alchemy in a theological light, while the defenders of alchemy had focused merely on its naturalistic implications. This growing tendency to theologize the issue of alchemy, I propose, provides the main reason for the increased number of condemnations tendered against it during the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. We should not forget that Innocent III and Gregory IX had already established the papal Inquisition in the first half of the thirteenth century, and that by the second half that dreaded institution was "fully organized."58 Oldrado's need to answer to the Canon Episcopi was not necessarily an anomaly: it may well have reflected the obsession with heterodoxy that had begun with the Albigensian Crusade and eventually resulted in the witch hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Despite the efforts of Giles, John XXII, and later Nicholas Eymeric, Latin alchemy could not be wiped out by proclamation or other official means. The My purpose in this essay has not been to prove the continued influence of alchemy on the development of applied science and technology throughout the Scientific Revolution, but merely to show that here, in these obscure treatises of the thirteenth century, a propagandistic literature of technological development was born. During this innovative period, alchemical writers and their allies produced a literary corpus that was among the earliest in Latin to promote actively the doctrine that art can equal or outdo the products of nature, even if human art is learned by imitating natural processes. Similarly, these alchemical propagandists-or at least the bolder among them-did not shy away from the conclusion that man can even change the order of the natural world by altering the species of those products. This technological dream, however premature, was to have a lasting effect on the direction taken by Western culture. 
